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STEVEN VERTOVEC

Diversifications



Steven Vertovec
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MMG Working Paper 19-03

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Contents

1.	Diversification(s): some meanings	7
2.	Public understanding of diversity and diversification	14
3.	9 modes or dynamics of understanding diversity and diversification	16
4.	Some ongoing thoughts	37
	References	41

The talk¹ I'll give today concerns *diversifications*. I will start by giving an overall explanation, of what I am talking about when I speak of diversifications. I use the concept firstly to refer to a general complexification of society. Secondly, I use it to zoom in on my particular field of study, which is migration-driven diversification.

Following this first bit, the bulk of the talk will be about the public understandings of diversity and diversification. I have identified at least nine modes or dynamics surrounding public understanding. How do people conceive of what is going on, particularly in terms of migration and migration-driven diversification? I will argue that the public understanding of diversity or diversification is important, not only as a subject in and of itself, but also as a context within which we do our work. It impacts upon all the different sort of things that we are studying: ethnographies of urban spaces, policies and law, public discourses, and movements and flows. I stress from the start, that this is all still work in progress – so in the discussion after the talk, criticism, comments and suggestions will be much appreciated.

1. Diversification(s): some meanings

First of all, I would like to emphasize that even though I am going to go on to focus on migration-driven diversification, it is important to bear in mind that there are other ways in which social categories, identities, intersectionalities, relationships and so forth, are getting more complex. There is a massive body of literature that we can draw on about the multiplication of social categories, identities and more. When we are looking at these together with lifestyles, family forms, roles or relationships, modes of inequality, we should realize that these are arguably all getting more complex. It is important to consider these other changes in society alongside all the migration and diversity-related things that we are looking at.

That is an important backdrop and, of course, it is going to have an impact upon what we are talking about by migration-driven diversifications. Social categories, identities, and intersectionalities all look at the expansion and proliferation of various identity-based social movements. In concrete terms, if you look at national censuses and the categories and boxes that one can tick on, you will see that these have proliferated over the past the past two or three decades. And these, of course, lead to

1 Transcript of a talk given at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Göttingen, 26 June, 2018.

I. Diversification



Expansion, multiplication, ‘complexification’ of

- ***Social Categories, Identities, Intersectionalities***
- ***Relationships*** – in number and type
- ***Outcomes*** – material, social, spatial, political, discursive and symbolic
- ***Reactions*** – in outlooks, understandings, everyday actions and political debates / contestations


Contemporary diversifications: sexualities, lifestyles, family forms, roles & relationships, modes of inequality, age and education-based perspectives...

- ***Here: migration-driven diversifications***

different sorts of outcomes, and different reactions to the expansion of social categories, identities and intersectionalities.


The numerous boxes that people can now tick are just crude measures of the expansion, multiplication, and complexification of various markers in societies. There are a lot of other things that we can pack into this complexification. For example, we can point to the fact that people, especially migrants, are living under multiple temporalities, and are subject to multiple mobilities. As society fragments attitudinally, too, we are seeing the manifestation of multiple moral orders. People have diverse selves that they can present from situation to situation – this really harks back to Goffman. There is also a lot of discussion about the relation between the multiple selves that people portray online on social media as opposed to the ways that they present themselves in ‘real life’.

I would like to move on now to migration and migration-driven diversification. For the past ten years now, I have been talking about how, globally, more people are moving from more places to more places than ever before. Here you see migrant ‘stocks’ in the USA, Canada, and Australia. The numbers of countries of origin between 1960 and 2000 have expanded considerably.



You can see here small groups, but from many places. And this makes an important impact on a lot of things. The notion of super-diversity that I coined to describe these kinds of processes, is now being picked-up in all kinds of places. Just recently, *The Economist* (2018) had a special article on migration. They simply write, “yes, superdiversity is happening”, but they are just looking at expansion of countries of origin, and that is not really the superdiversity that I am talking about. But anyways, the concept is out there, and it is becoming recognized that migration flows are getting more complex themselves.

In a nutshell, when I talk about as superdiversity, I stress that not only do we have more countries of origins and more countries of destinations and changing patterns thereof, but that all of these flows are increasingly channelled in different ways that we can demonstrate and visualize. Country of origin, migration stream, legal status, gender patterns, age patterns, human capital patterns – these are all getting divided up in different ways and by the time that people arrive in a country of destination, vis-à-vis, their migration stream, legal status and so on, they are almost immediately stratified in different ways. And this differentiation of flows and stratifications are creating new configurations, particularly in cities.



Migration-driven diversifications (i.e. creating conditions of *super-diversity*)

Migrants are increasingly channeled

(jointly by patterns of: country of origin, migration stream, legal status, gender, age, human capital, etc.)

into highly differential positions


(marked by variable socio-economic opportunities/constraints, political rights/restrictions, and geographic locations)


creating new national and urban configurations

(of economic development and inequality, 'integration' and exclusion, conflict and conviviality, privilege and precarity)

So, change creating new patterns of superdiversity is happening, but it is important to recognize that it is happening differently, at different speeds, in different places. [That reminds me of a disingenuous critique once in an article in *International Migration Review*. Trying to pick a hole in the superdiversity argument, it showed through myriad statistics that global migration is indeed significantly differentiating, but it is not happening evenly around the world. But, I never said that in the first place – it would be a ridiculous thing to say.] Through a lot more and better data that, we can observe different kinds and paces of migration-driven diversification. This is an example: a Russell Sage Foundation Study that recently showed that just within the US, there is a wide range of diversity profiles and kinds of diversification. From white communities shrinking to ‘minority-majority’ communities – i.e., communities where basically whites are in a minority and all ‘ethnic minorities’ add up to more than half the population. And the pace changes, so as you go around the country, there are different diversification processes going on. This is part of what I am talking about in the plural of ‘diversifications’.

Here is a Brookings Institution study from a couple of years ago looking at the same sort of thing. It depicts how, in different parts of the country between 2000 and






Divergent diversifications

‘We find that almost all communities—whether large immigrant gateways or small towns in the nation’s heartland—have grown more diverse. However, the data show a **wide range of diversity profiles**, from predominantly white communities (a shrinking number) to minority-majority and no-majority ones (an increasing number). The **pace** of local diversity gains, as well as shifts in racial-ethnic composition, **has similarly varied**.’

– Lee et al. 2012: I


2010, we witnessed very differential rates of diversification. The indicates an increase in new minorities coming to places. The traditional, so-called melting pots around the edges, show a relatively low growth rate at 33%. These new sun belt destinations – about which there is a lot of research – have grown by 68% just in that 10-year period. These are just a few examples showing that, geographically, we have very different paces of migration-driven diversification. Another thing that this Brookings Institution Report showed is differential diversification by way of generation. Basically, the Brookings data indicates the increasing divergences between an old, predominantly white versus a young, highly diverse population. This is yet another process of diversification that will have future impacts of various kinds. And then – when you multiply generational by geographical difference – you are getting very different paces and kinds of diversification happening simultaneously around the U.S.



Social Organization of Difference

Although the term is ubiquitous and does a lot of good work, for social scientific purpose I want to throw out the word diversity and use instead the notion of ‘the social organization of difference’. This is how I make sense of a lot of stuff going on, not least differential processes of diversification. I argue that we have got to constantly

look at overall *configurations* (structural conditions, including socio-economic structures, demographics and political institutions), and their relation to *representations* (the ways socially constructed categories appear in public discourses and images), and the *encounters* or ways that people actually have contact with each other (interpersonal interactions). My whole argument is that these three domains are mutually conditioning. But they change at different paces – what I call domain lag. So, in some of these places for instance, places where you have processes of diversification going on, the configurations are changing in terms of the social profiles. But the way people talk about them have not caught up yet, and maybe people's encounters are way ahead of the representations, the way people actually have the tools to talk about what is happening in their communities or how they are engaging with people. And in 'the public understanding of diversity', which I will come to, representations are sometimes completely if not wildly out of step with actual configurations that are all around them. People anticipate diversification processes that are going on and freak out, developing a whole language about what they think is happening (e.g., migration is 'out of control' or Europe is being 'Islamicized'). But this idea of domain lag is one of the main things I want to talk about now in terms of the public understanding of diversity and diversification. Up to now I've given a kind of introduction to diversifi-



Impacts and implications of reformulating
(any nation-state's, city's or neighborhood's)

Social Organization of Difference

Changing

- **Configurations**
 - *patterns, institutions and structures of society*
- **Representations**
 - *socially constructed categories in images and discourses*
- **Encounters**
 - *Interpersonal interactions, practices and behaviours*

= Inherently related / mutually conditioning domains

Yet 'domain lag': differential paces of change

cations, this idea that there are different profiles emerging and they are happening at different paces within all kinds of different societies, cities and neighbourhoods. That is the backdrop to what follows.

2. Public understanding of diversity and diversification

Now, the rest of the talk is about public understanding. I will point to nine modes, dimensions or spheres of influence impacting on public understandings of diversity and diversification. Firstly, I wish to stress that this is a terribly significant field to study and understand in itself; secondly, it is important to understand it as a backdrop for the other sorts of diversification dynamics we are concerned with. Public understanding is focal to the idea that representations – what people think and talk about and the discourses they create around diversification – impact on everyday encounters as well as broader social structures. And as you probably already infer from just these two images, there exist vastly different public understandings of diversity and diversification.



Source: AFP Photo



Source: AFP Photo

National comparative views

Before I come to the nine modes influencing the public understanding of diversity and diversification, we need to recognize that, of course, country by country, understandings and attitudes towards diversification are different. In each nation-state and relevant language, what do people envision by way of diversification (here ‘increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in our country’), what do they fear in it? How does diversification relate to national images,

folk histories and social imaginaries of the nation? The answers to these questions are obviously quite different, but are critical to public understanding. This could be the focus of a large and hugely interesting comparative study.

So, this slide indicates one kind of measure of attitudes towards diversification. Having said that, in the next several slides as I go through these modes, you will see that it is important to try to think about perceptions and attitudes and what leads to what. Do your attitudes shape your perceptions of diversity or does your understanding of diversity shape your attitude towards it? The literature shows that the jury is out on that.


In this Pew Centre Research graphic showing several different countries, few say a growing diversity makes their country a better place. 41% of Hungarians, for example, thinks growing diversity makes a country a worse place to live. But, how much diversity is there actually in Hungary? Still, they are against it. These findings don't explain anything, but they throw up comparative indicators that need to be unpacked. But again, to get behind these attitudes you have to delve into the question: what do they actually think diversification is? What do they think is going on in different places?

This is still before we get to the nine modes. The next slide shows something that is so obvious, that it is almost banal: people on the right are more likely than people on the left to say that increasing diversity makes life worse. But I think this is an interesting graphic, as it shows

people who self-identify on a political spectrum from left to right and what their attitude is towards diversification, towards growing diversity. In Germany, this means that among people who self-identify on the left, 14% of those people don't like the idea of diversification. And, surprisingly, in Germany, according to Pew, only 50% of people who self-identify as on the right in Germany, are really against diversification. And, if I read this right, there are actually more people on the Greek left who are against diversification than there are on the right in the Netherlands. What is going on there?

Few say growing diversity makes their country a better place to live

Overall, do you think having an increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in our country makes this country a better place to live, a worse place to live or doesn't make much difference either way?



Pew Research Center 2016

In many places across the respective political spectrum, there seems to be hostility towards diversification and increasing diversity. And again, this instantly begs the question: what are they thinking when you ask them about growing diversity? What do they picture? What do they fear? What do they anticipate?

The table here presents findings that people with less education think increasing diversity makes places less attractive to live. Basically, the higher the education levels, the more likely that people are more okay with increasing diversity. We see this education variable in a lot of opinion research and attitude research. I don't know why education level is necessarily such a powerful variable. Obviously, not everybody is doing a degree in Sociology or Political Science. Why would a degree in Mathematics or Business Studies make you more liberal on ideas of increasing diversity?

People on the right more likely than those on the left to say increasing diversity makes life worse

An increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in our country makes this country a worse place to live



Note: Only statistically significant differences shown.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, Q44.

Pew Research Center 2016

Those with less education say increasing diversity makes their country a worse place to live

An increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in our country makes this country a worse place to live

	Less education	More education	Diff
	%	%	
Netherlands	43	22	-21
UK	37	17	-20
Spain	26	12	-14
Sweden	30	17	-13
Germany	39	27	-12
France	27	17	-10

Note: Only statistically significant differences shown. For the purpose of comparing educational groups across countries, we standardize education levels based on the UN's International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The lower education category is secondary education or below and the higher category is postsecondary or above.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, Q44.

Pew Research Center 2016

3. 9 modes or dynamics of understanding diversity and diversification


1. *Diversification from afar*

Let's get into the nine modes. A lot of these modes are leading to fear of diversification, but hopefully this will become clear why as we go on. The first mode or dynamic influencing how people understand diversity and diversification is what I call 'diversi-

fication from afar'. That is, when people extrapolate or abstract to the national level as opposed to their local community. A different dynamic is going on, that people usually imagine the worst things to be happening on the national level, while usually saying, 'well actually in my local community it is not a problem.' But when we take the country, it is a problem.

Now we know this, first of all, just from public opinions on immigration. Here is an Ipsos MORI study – but there are plenty of other ones. Of course, immigration per se is not the same thing as diversification, but I just want to throw this up as a good graphic. When people are asked, do you think immigration is a problem in the country? Yes, yes, everybody says yes. Is immigration a problem in your community? Well, no, not really. There seems to be a disconnect, there is something about abstracting one's views to the larger level that influences what people think is going on. That's why I call this a mode or dynamic of understanding diversity.

Figure 6.3: Immigration as a problem in Britain and the local area




Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014

Nation vs. locality

We find the same thing in Germany. In a study of a couple of years ago, just as the so-called refugee wave was crashing, in Saxony where the levels of foreign-born are miniscule compared to other parts of Germany, 58% of people said that Germany

is in danger of being over-foreignized. Asked about their own community, only 17% said that there is a problem. Again, by abstraction up to broader levels, their impressions are different. This is naturally informed by what they hear or gather from the media or from social media. It is quite likely that people are thinking that what they deem to be happening to the country, they start fearing, it's going to come here locally. And that's why often they are against it even though they haven't had any personal experience of a nasty encounter or anything bad happening. I call this an 'abstracted diversity from afar'.



- **Saxony:** 58% say Germany “over-foreignized to a dangerous degree”

[„durch die vielen Ausländer in einem gefährlichen Maß überfremdet“]

– German average: 18% agree

- **Saxony:** yet only 17% claim "their personal living context is [...] over-foreignized to a dangerous degree "

[„ihre persönliche Wohnumgebung [...] durch die vielen Ausländer in einem gefährlichen Maße überfremdet [ist]“]

- Sachsen Monitor (n.d.) / Zick, Küpper and Krause 2016

2. Over-representing Diversification

And that goes hand in hand with ‘over-representing diversification’. This mode refers to the fact that people, routinely, everywhere always think there are more ethnic minorities and more foreigners than there actually are in a country.


This comparative graphic comes from another study on various countries such as France, Switzerland, Luxemburg, Germany and Greece. This graph indicates what people the share of foreigners in their country is. French people, on the whole, thought that about 28% of France is comprised of foreign-born people. The actual number,

on the x-axis, is 10%. So, they more than double the number that they imagine actually are in the country. And of course, this is going to have an impact on how they understand, how they perceive, and what their attitudes towards diversity are going to be. Findings in some countries show this more than in others. If people got it right, they would be on the diagonal line and if they underestimated, they would be below it. Yet in all of these countries, and there are other studies you can similarly draw on, people are constantly overestimating the number of foreigners in their country.

Misperception of the Size of the Foreign-Born Population

People were asked to estimate the share of the foreign-born population – this chart compares the estimated share of the foreign-born population with the actual share of foreign-born residents. In every country people overestimate the share of immigrants in their population.


Our World
in Data



Sides and Citrin 2007

In European countries, this over-estimation is usually about foreigners, whereas in the U.S. such studies are usually about race, because the U.S. is almost always just collecting data with regard to their six-fold racial classification. That said, in the U.S. too, people are vastly overestimating current and future levels of diversity – as depicted in a Center for American Progress study. Here it is especially interesting and important, since many studies automatically assume this is just whites doing such over-estimation. I put this up to show that, well no, within every American racial group surveyed, everybody overestimates the number of ethnic or racial minorities in the country.

‘Americans vastly overestimate current and future levels of diversity’




Teixeira and Halpin 2013



United Kingdom:

- the public think that **31%** of the population are immigrants, when the official figures are **13%**
- the average estimate is that **Black and Asian** people make up **30%** of the population, when it is actually **11%**

Figure 1.20: Overestimation of foreign born population vs too many foreign born people in COUNTRY




Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014

Likewise, in the UK, people think that 31% of the population are immigrants while official figures are 13%. Or in racial terms, people generally surveyed think that 30% of the British population is Black or an Asian ethnic minority, when it is actually 11%. But this is where this business about estimation and attitudes comes in. On the x-axis of this Ipsos Mori graph are the numbers of people who say that there are too many people living in a country who were not born there. So, these are people who agree that there are 'too many foreigners'. On the y-axis we see the amount of people that overestimate the foreign population. Together, there is a clear relationship between overestimating the foreign population and negative attitudes towards the number of foreigners. Many people are freaking out because they think that 28% of the country is foreign-born, and they don't want any more.

This also goes not just for now but for what (particularly, White) people think is going to happen in the future and how it affects their self-identified group.


3. Anticipated diversification

This next interesting graphic, again from Ipsos MORI, is not about diversification writ large, but about people's attitudes or perception specifically regarding the Muslim population. People are asked, 'in 2020 what percentage of people or how many



out of a hundred, do you think will be Muslim in your country?’ The visualization presents considerable gaps between what people think the number is going to be and the actual, demographically projected figures. So again, with the average guess that 40% of France will be Muslim by 2020, we can come towards a better analysis of why many French are deeply concerned about Muslims. The actual number is that it’s going to be about 8.3%. One can see, right through South Africa, Italy, Belgium, Germany, even the Canadians – the kind of poster children of diversity – people are over-anticipating to various degrees; the public understanding of diversity and diversification is enormously affected by people’s envisioned demographic future.

Then there is what we can call the ‘actual future’. We know that by 2050 in the entire U.S., Whites will be in the minority. This is indicated in a set of figures here.



Responses to ‘majority-minority’ future

So, this is a kind of actual future and there are lots of studies now in Social Psychology and Political Psychology asking: What do people think when you show them this fact that Whites will be in the minority in the U.S. by 2050? How does that affect their understanding of, and attitudes toward, diversity?

Especially for surveyed Whites who think – as it is put in the literature, that their racial position is ‘legitimate’ (we built this country, we deserve a better place in society

than others) – their responses entail resentment, anger and fear. In Social Psychology there are several theories as to why that is. These include: intergroup threat (the larger the perceived groups, the more negative the views about them; this is directly related to anti-immigration policies and voting (Craig et al. 2018)); *group-status threat* (loss of the dominance of one's own group, or curtailment of privileged access to resources, leads to negative attitudes; this is linked to tendencies toward anti-immigration behaviours (Major et al. 2016)) and prototypicality threat (for Americans who believe that American identity is wrapped up in Whiteness, the prospects of diversification are equated with the idea that America is being destroyed; such views are correlated with strong views for ethnic minority assimilation and against diversity (Outten et al. 2018)).





**Responses to 'majority-minority' future
among Whites who see their racial position as legitimate
- resentment, anger & fear**

- **Intergroup threat**
 - the larger the perception of minority groups,
the more negative the views about those groups
 - *prompts anti-immigration attitudes*
- **Group-status threat**
 - loss of dominance/access to resources
 - *tendency toward conservative politics*
- **'Prototypicality threat'**
 - Being American = Being White
 - *response: 1. assimilation, 2. against 'diversity'*

Now this is the interesting thing, too – maybe not surprising but worth knowing that it has been studied. These people – who harbour anti-immigration attitudes based on their own overestimation of the number of ethnic minorities or the number of foreigners, or who believe that in the future Muslims or foreigners are going to comprise a massive proportion of the population – still do not change their attitudes when they are given the correct information. So, this is going to be a lesson I'll come to at the end of the lecture: for us, as academics, just giving information and research

(non-)Impacts of corrected information





Sides 2018

Hopkins et al. 2018

‘Americans are prone to exaggerate the size of the foreign-born population—much as they exaggerate the size of many minority groups—and these misperceptions are linked to unfavorable views of immigration.’

‘[C]orrect information has little impact on attitudes about immigration—regardless of whether that information is about the immigrant population nationwide, the undocumented immigrant population nationwide, or the local immigrant population.’


- Hopkins et al. 2018: 2, 6

findings is not going to change attitudes. I experienced this for a long time when I was working at COMPAS in the UK. We tried to throw facts out there in the public sphere all the time and it did not have any effect.

4. *Small but rapid diversification*


Another dynamic or factor that influences the public understanding of diversification -- if not fear of diversification -- is what I call small but rapid diversification. People's attitudes are shaped when, particularly in their local community, a small degree of migration-driven diversification appears when compared to a longstanding demographic condition. If it is deemed too quick, however small, people freak out about it.

So again, in Saxony which we know is home to Pegida and a large vote for AfD, from 2015 there was a rapid diversification of the population. It was extremely small compared to the rest of Germany; but for Saxony that was a rapid diversification. Especially with lots of different groups. The graphic depicts migrants' origins in a considerable variety of countries in a very short space of time. I am not saying, we have to accept the outburst of xenophobic sentiments that followed, but we have to




Coming back to the U.S., below we see that districts that diversified rapidly were more likely to vote Trump. This is a great graphic by the *Washington Post* that shows diversification configurations. The yellow and yellowish green represent places that were low in diversity (and again, this is all by way of the American racial classification) in 2000 and by 2015 had diversified rapidly in relative terms. The blue, and the darker are places, places around the coast, are places that had high diversity in 2000 and did not change much in that period of time. So, it is these sorts of areas that are really interesting and again, we are talking about differential kinds, conditions and paces of diversification.

As we can see below, the darker red places are the places where Trump increased the Republican vote. It is not a direct correlation, and there are of course lots of reasons why people voted Trump, but reaction to small but rapid diversification was certainly a factor. A lot of it is on the imagined level though. People might hear about some Latinos that have moved in to town, or that a factory has a lot of new Latino workers. Subsequently, many people haven't actually encountered the newcomers or had a problem with them themselves, but in their imagination, there is a difficulty; even the Republican activist quoted here is saying „It's more a perceived problem




than an actual problem.“ So, the whole idea of what people *think* is going on importantly affects their attitudes.



Brexit Referendum and pace of change



It wasn’t long before I got to Brexit, because I also have British citizenship! In the top graph from *The Economist* (ref.), we see that the places with the most immigrants voted to remain. In the lower graph, it is clear that the places that had the most rapid change in diversity in relative terms, places that went through small but rapid diversification like Boston in the north, tended overwhelmingly to vote Brexit. Previously, these places might have had a few Asian shopkeepers and some Black-Caribbean residents; in the space of ten years, suddenly, there appeared Poles and Lithuanians and others, maybe some refugees too. There are all sorts of studies that the Brexit vote was a proxy for immigration. Here, there is a high correlation, indicating that people voted Brexit when they didn’t like the rapid diversification of their community.



5. Diversification next door – The ‘Halo-effect’

Another dynamic is the ‘Halo-effect’. This is a term given in some of the literature to the fact that we tend to find high prevalence of xenophobic attitudes, generally not in places with the most immigrants or foreign-born or ethnic minority people, but in the largely White places right next to highly diverse places.

One way to show this can be seen in these London graphics, by way of one key diversity index measuring the co-presence of up to ten ethnic minority groups. Red-bridge and Barking, at the upper left in the graph, are the most diverse places in London. They are right next to the most segregated place in London (lower left graph), which in this case means the most ‘White’ place in London, the borough of Havering. As it happens, Havering is the place with the highest Brexit vote (upper right graph) and the only place with this substantial UKIP vote in London (lower right graph) as well. This is known as the ‘Halo-effect.’ [I think ‘Halo’ is an inappropriate name for it because it sounds virtuous – but it’s simply intended to mean a kind of ring around something]. You have a highly diverse area, and then in the areas right next to it or surrounding it, you have xenophobic attitudes.



This ‚Halo-effect‘ is yet another one of these dynamics or factors influencing the public understanding of diversity and diversification. Another example seems to be in the Netherlands. This election map shows two of the only places in the Netherlands which had a solid vote for Geert Wilders: these are two places immediately adjacent to superdiverse Rotterdam. There are probably all sorts of reasons for such election results, but some scholars suggest that the ‚Halo-effect‘ is an important part of it: people observing what is happening next door and saying, „I don’t want that in my place, so I am going to vote for the right wing, xenophobic party.“ As I mentioned before, immigration is not necessarily the exact same thing as diversification, but in terms of perceptions and attitudes these do highly overlap.

6. Fear of diversification and antipathy toward immigration

I usually boil down anti-immigrant policies, perspectives, and discourses, to being about four things. Basically, people are often against immigration because they believe it is going to: (1) effect the labour market, or (2) be a burden on the state because immigrants are imagined to flood health services and schools among other things. They are going to either be (3) terrorists or lead to increasing crime or (4) the



Fear of diversification – not same as antipathy toward immigration, but certain overlaps

Anti-immigration reasons include:

- (1) Labour market competition; (2) fiscal burden;*
- (3) crime/security; (4) threat to national culture*
- Studies show: (4) – if ethnicized – tends to surpass other reasons (cf. ‘prototypical American’)

“People aren’t rational, they rationalize”


E.g., using economic arguments against immigration yet reasons may actually be more social/cultural at heart

national culture is going to be destroyed. These are the four basic anti-immigrant reasonings that are often given by people in surveys and opinion polls. There is probably more we can add, but those are the ones I tend to see all the time. There are various studies that show that people can variously argue for one thing or the other, but if you ask them about national culture in ethnic terms – like this ‘prototypical American’ thing I mentioned before, i.e. that being American is basically being white – then this argument tends to trump all the other ones. “National culture is something we have to protect” – especially if it is associated with race and ethnicity. So that is one way we can see that there is this awkward overlap between attitudes towards immigration and attitudes towards diversification. In behavioural economics terms: people are not rational but they rationalize. So even people who say, “I am against immigration because of the economy and the labour market “, often times are really talking about the threat to ethnicized national culture and they are rationalizing it in terms of economy.

Immigration – Diversity link: How to change narratives?

The next slide comes from a study done by Eric Kaufmann (2016), from Birkbeck College in London, in which he took different sets of respondents, all white working-class Britons with common characteristics, and asked them the same question: “Immigration should be reduced a lot, yes or no?” But he primed the groups differently before asking the question (this is a common method in Social Psychology or Political Psychology). Before asking them the question, he told one group the story about how, for generations, waves of immigrants from diverse backgrounds have come to the UK and made the country a highly diverse and successful place of interacting people. And although the proportion of Whites went down, everybody is living in a harmonious, multicultural society. To the second lot of people he told the story that generations of migrants have come to the UK and they have all assimilated into British culture and largely left all of their customs and habits behind, so it is all one British people now. Kaufmann then asked them this question about reducing immigration. On the one hand, people that were told the diversity story weren’t very convinced, and preferred reducing immigration. People who think diversification is going to happen were more against halting immigration. But on the other hand, people that were told the assimilation story were more okay with immigration: they were primed with a line of thinking that people will assimilate and diversification will not be an issue. So again, it is this idea that there is this direct link but it depends on how you frame it. Kaufmann goes on to say, then, even as academics “Shouldn’t we be

telling the story a lot more?”. I leave that question open. How should we be contributing to one story or the other, if we know what some of the outcomes are going to be?




Kaufmann 2016

7. 'Experienced Other' vs. 'Imagined Other'

A lot of these dynamics come down to what we can call a relation between the 'Experienced Other' versus the 'Imagined Other'. A lot of what I am addressing when I consider people projecting what they think is happening to the country and what they think is happening with diversification is about what they think the 'other' to be.


First, there is the 'experienced other'. Here, I would like to point out that I am a firm believer in contact theory. If people have direct, positive encounters under certain conditions, it is proven to lead to more positive attitudes towards specific groups and towards diversity as a whole. These graphs are from the large 'Diversity and Contact' project that was held at the MPI-MMG, showing the amount of contact that Germans have with foreign-born people. We were surprised by how many individuals report contact, either daily, weekly or more than once a month, with

foreign-born people. Additionally, most people saw these as generally positive, as pleasant or very pleasant. Only a very thin slice of people saw these encounters that they have - daily, weekly or more - as unpleasant.



We can talk also in different ways about the ‚imagined other‘, but one thing I am intrigued by in working with some Social Psychologists, and even a Neuroscientist within the Max Planck Group, is the idea of entitativity. Entitativity refers to how people conceive of other groups and how much they function as entities (‚entitative‘ comes from the word entity). So how much do you think that Muslims think as one and have one kind of strategy? In other words, how entitative do you think they are? This is used in a lot of stereotype studies and similar research. This addresses not just attitudes about other groups, but also how much you think people of a certain category are all alike and have the same perspectives and values and how much of a social boundary one thinks they have. So, it is about concepts and attitudes about the nature of other groups. The interesting thing, is that it has been discovered that among people under conditions of personal stress of various kinds – such as health, financial or employment stress – perceptions of the degree of entitativity of other groups increases, such as the more they think that ‚those Muslims‘ or ‚those refugees‘ think and act as one. That is an interesting thing to bear in mind when thinking about


the public understanding of diversification. People are under stress for all sorts of reasons and this kind of finding helps us to see how they can put all Muslims in a single box. Entitativity underpins various kinds of threat scenarios, and is directly relevant to what I subsume as the 'Imagined Other'. And let's face it: in a lot of people's heads the 'imagined other' is a lot stronger than the 'experienced other'. This is an important dynamic or mode in the public understanding of diversity.




Imagined Other: what 'they' are thinking, doing...

Social Psychology & Neuroscience:


- *people under stress view out-groups as more*
‘entitative’ (groupy):
single-minded, negative and more threatening
 – Underpinning various threat scenarios



Brauer 2001



Steinbeis et al. 2015




Hewstone et al. 2002

8. Communication Breakdown

The next mode is communication breakdown. I always say that language is one of the most understudied areas in the whole field of migration and diversity studies, even though super-diversity has been a hot topic in sociolinguistics over the past five to ten years. This is to say, there are all sorts of interesting things going on and great theoretical work being done in sociolinguistics and anthropological linguistics, but they are unfortunately largely talking to themselves and we migration and diversity scholars have got to learn more from them.

And this one of the dynamics that I would like to learn more about: Why does language difference freak people out so much? And it certainly does, there are all

sorts of studies as a whole subfield of sociopsychology just on multi-linguistic angst. It is known that people who encounter others who do not speak the same language or do not speak it sufficiently, or they are uncomfortable with people who have lower levels of linguistic competence, often experience high levels of stress. This is not just awkwardness, nervousness, impatience and frustration, but often outright anger and hostility. People report cognitively and emotionally taxing encounters when talking to people they are not having a direct linguistic exchange with. And not only that, some people think that if you are not speaking properly or you are not understanding me properly, that you are stupid or that you are not to be trusted. A book edited by Jan Blommaert and colleagues, called *Dangerous Multilingualism*, shows that people with low levels of linguistic competence in my language “are imagined as being disordered, impure and abnormal, [...] at risk of being disqualified, marginalized, stigmatized or excluded” (Blommaert et al. 2012: 9).



Socio-linguistics of super-diversity

- ‘a sociolinguistic lens is key to a developed understanding of superdiverse societies.’
- multi-linguistic resources / multiple discursive practices to perform multiple subject positions
- ‘poly-centricity of semiotic resources’
- complex repertoire – ‘heteroglossia’
- ‘translanguaging’
- ‘digital’ SD and ‘online’ SD

Duarte and Gogolin 2013; Blommaert 2013; Goebel 2015; Arnaut et al. 2016; Creese and Blackledge 2018

Fear of linguistic diversification

linguistic boundaries associated with:

- Adverse emotional responses (awkwardness, nervousness, impatience and frustration)
- Cognitively and emotionally taxing encounter
- Confused expressivity, unknown non-verbal styles
- Low competence = low trustworthiness
- Stress and unpleasant experience

‘imagined as being disordered, impure and abnormal. Those who use such forms are at risk of being disqualified, marginalized, stigmatized or excluded.’

Blommaert et al. 2012: 9

Here, the idea is that not only is diversification happening by way of other countries of origin, other legal statuses and all these sort of things, but the fact of other languages coming in has a huge impact, cognitively and emotionally, on people and their understanding and fear of diversification. So, we need to know a lot more about this because it is at the heart of everyday life.

Unsurprisingly, as this table shows, people on the right think it is more important to speak the majority language than people on the left.

Ability to speak national language more important to those on right than on left

Being able to speak our national language is very important for being truly (survey country nationality)

	Left	Center	Right	Right-left Diff
	%	%	%	
France	67	73	89	+22
Sweden	54	65	74	+20
UK	69	81	88	+19
Spain	48	69	64	+16
Germany	73	77	87	+14
Greece	72	72	86	+14

Note: Only statistically significant differences shown. In France asked “French,” in Germany asked “German,” in Greece asked “Greek,” in Spain asked “Spanish,” in Sweden asked “Swedish” and in the UK asked “English.” English is the most commonly spoken language in the UK, but there is no official national language.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q85b.


Pew Research Center 2016

9. 'Diversity' and diversification

We know that 'diversity' is a huge concept out there. I wrote an article a few years ago about the rise of diversity as a kind of public concept and set of policies, trainings and initiatives and so forth, and how we got there (Vertovec 2012). We know that the diversity concept is everywhere. We have got the 'Diversity in Cities' project here at the Institute (<http://www.mmg.mpg.de/de/subsites/citydiv/ueber-das-projekt/>) that shows the prevalence of the diversity concept and policies across cities in Germany and France. In a lot of ways, diversity and associated notions of tolerance and respect are successful because you find them everywhere, from corporations to urban governance to universities etc. But is it starting to become a victim of its own success? And how does this impact on all these perceptions of diversification?

The normative notion of diversity, especially in the U.S. where everything is diversity, e.g. debates about the Oscars and so on, is at risk of triggering what one journalist (Hsu 2017) calls "diversity fatigue" because there is so much pro-diversity stuff out there. Mark Lilla (2016), who wrote a controversial piece in *The New York Times*, is saying that this is actually backfiring on the Democrats as they are talking too much about diversity and should drop it. On the right there are explicit anti-diversity movements and explicit statements saying diversity with all its features is bad and is destroying the country. That "White Genocide" is another name for "Diversity", for example. But I was particularly horrified, appalled and disappointed by one incident. This summer in Germany, there was a lot of demonstrations and public talk about Susanne F., a young woman who was murdered in May by a man who then fled to Iraq, a horrible case. But at one little shrine (upper right photo) that people set up for the victim, it was written "Opfer der Toleranz" meaning "victim of tolerance." I find that horrifying, but it goes along with a lot of this thinking that the diversity concept and norms have become so successful that it needs to be countered.

'Diversity fatigue'



THE NEW YORKER

JOINT BY REVIEW


THE YEAR IN "DIVERSITY FATIGUE"

By Hsu 2017 December 16, 2017

In the late nineties, people running corporations and government agencies began complaining of an affliction called "diversity fatigue." While many of these institutions loudly responded efforts to create a more diverse workforce, actually doing that, by recruiting and retaining minority talent, was hard, often exhausting, work. "Diversity fatigue" described the stress that managers felt when tasked with realizing those goals. One time, the term drifted from its workplace roots and took on a wider, more everyday meaning. Soon, everyone was fine to find itself of diversity. In 2016, the writers Ed Brissman and Ashley Merryman explained that it often felt like "walking on eggshells" to

Hsu 2017


'Diversity' backlash



HUFFPOST

GOP Candidate Suggests Diversity In America Will Spark Civil War

O'Connor 2018



THE HILL

Rep. Steve King: "Diversity is not our strength"

Thomsen 2017

'Over time, the term drifted from its workplace roots and took on a wider, more everyday meaning. Soon, everyone was free to feel tired of diversity.'

Despite ‘fatigue’ and anti-diversity

A measure of hope is imparted by this Centre for American Progress study (Teixeira and Halpin 2013) - which was pre-Trump, so I do not know if it still holds - but suggesting that most public opinion polls show that people are still more okay with diversity than not. This is also shown in Germany through a study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung (Unzicker and Grau (n.d.)). It brings me to one of the last things I want to point out: again, attitudes and opinions of diversity themselves are diversifying.

Despite ‘fatigue’ and anti-diversity...

- ‘Americans are much more open to diversity and more supportive of steps to reduce racial inequalities than is commonly portrayed in politics and the media.’

Teixeira and Halpin 2013: 3

The study by the Centre for American Progress included a set of 16 questions and a 10-point scale about how open people are to diversity – that is, the whole package of norms concerning tolerance, respect, engaging people on their own terms of identity and so forth. It is not hugely surprising that there are all sorts of other variables that go along with how open people are to diversity. This broadening array of attitudes toward diversity represent another sub-mode of diversification, as they are based on various understandings of what comprise diversity, diversification and living with these phenomena.


16 questions, 10-point scale**e.g.s:**

...will be enriched by exposure to many different cultures.

...more diverse workforce will lead to more economic growth.

With more diverse people working and living together, discrimination will decrease.

...will be more conflict between ethnic and racial groups.

FIGURE 1**Composite index of openness to diversity**

Teixeira and Halpin 2013

4. Some ongoing thoughts

Concerning research on diversifications, there many new statistics and ways of putting together multiple variables and data visualizations to look at diversification and superdiversification. In empirical terms, I am working with people in Canada, Australia and New Zealand on new statistical analyses and visualizations. At the same time, we are also witnessing the impacts of diversification processes on ethnographic and sociological methods: for instance, in two weeks there is an upcoming conference in Montréal (July 2018) focused on the ethnography of urban diversity in order to look at methods for researching diversification and superdiversity in different environments. This was also one of the methodological interests in our large 'Globaldiversities' project (Vertovec 2015a; also see <http://www.mmg.mpg.de/sites/globaldivercities/about/>). So, scholars are re-tooling and talking about different methods for how we can better look at better migration-driven diversification.

I still do not know what theories are going to come out of this focus on diversifications. I am churning this through my 'configurations-representations-encounters' model concerning the social organization of difference (Vertovec 2015b) to turn it into a more theoretical analysis. If we want to go back to the basics, I suggest, we

might want to dig out ‘organic solidarity’ from Durkheim again to underscore how urban modern societies are held together, interdependently, by difference. Is there a way of dusting that off and applying it to diversification?

Generally, I argue that we have to be able to build a kind of complexity theory. There are already a number of books out there about social science and complexity – but they are talking about complexity like physicists do, e.g. relating to the ‘butterfly effect’, chaos theory and so on. This is not really what I am talking about. I think we need new, social scientific theories of complexity that can make sense of changing patterns and outcomes concerning multiple subject positions, multiplex identities and ever-evolving, multifaceted modes of relationship.



IV. Ongoing thoughts

A. Researching migration-driven diversification

- New multi-variable stat.s and data visualizations
- Multi-dimensional soc./ethnog. methods
- Towards theory
 - **Social Organization of Difference**
 - Revisit Durkheimian *organic solidarity?*
(*interdependence through dissimilarity*)?
 - Complexity (but not math/physics stuff)

Understanding public views of diversity and diversification

We need to get a better perspective on what people think is happening by way of all these diversification processes, which we can look at empirically and ethnographically. There is much to research about things like ideas of the ‘imagined other’, how people generalize and how they extrapolate up scales, how the ‘halo-effect’ works, and how rapid but small change or different paces of change affect people’s perceptions. Additionally, we have to understand better how people process the information they

receive or perceive about diversification. Importantly, we have to take on board new theoretical works about confirmation bias through which people filter out information that does not fit their understanding of diversification. And just what is it about language and communication that feeds often negative perceptions of diversity? And how does this success, as it were, of the diversity concept relate to perceptions of diversification? (My hunch is that there is somehow a disconnect: that, for instance, when people talk about refugees in Germany, they don't think of diversity policies like "Vielfalt bewegt Frankfurt" (diversity moves Frankfurt) and all that. They are somehow kept conceptually in different boxes, but this is just my impression).



B. Understanding public views of diversity / diversification

depends on perceptions of diversity

- Imagined Other 'out there' vs on doorstep
 - How many, how quickly changing, how entitative
- Attitudes~information processing (cf. bias)
- How own group is conceived/valued (status)
- How perceptions related to own experience
- What is it about language & communication?
- Relation: understanding 'diversity'~diversification

Ameliorating fear of diversification

What can we do with regard to the public understanding of diversification(s)? One thing might be promoting contact theory, which demonstrates the positive effects on attitudes when people have positive encounters with 'different' others. And then, there is this issue about narratives. Academics can not just lob academic findings and facts into the public sphere, trying to get the media to pick up our results and facts and show them to people. We know that you need compelling narratives to effectively inform people. Particularly, images are a great way to create or shape narratives, so

that is why I am so interested in data visualizations. We also need better concepts as well as narratives; we cannot just continue to tell people that diversity and multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism are ideal models for society. For some sectors of society, we are the part of the enemy of liberal elites. Of course, some think, academics are going to say that people should engage diversity and be more cosmopolitan. So, we are immediately written off. How do we get things across then? Playing with narrative is a better way to do that. I wholly admit that I do not yet know what it should look like, so I leave it there for now: with a deep concern with the dilemma of how we can discuss and assuage concerns about today's multiple processes of diversification.

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