



Max Planck Institute for the Study of
Religious and Ethnic Diversity

Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung multireligiöser
und multiethnischer Gesellschaften

MMG Working Paper 10-08 • ISSN 2192-2357

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Integration Impacts on Diaspora-
Homeland Relations



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Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung multireligiöser und multiethnischer Gesellschaften,
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity
Göttingen

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ISSN 2192-2357 (MMG Working Papers Print)

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Abstract

The general public, politicians, and the media are now showing much greater interest in what are known as “transnational communities” and “diasporas”. However, as many observers have already noted, each of these types of entities constitute an extremely complex and divergent phenomenon. The increase in the number of transnational and diasporic communities and of their members, their consequent growing roles and activities in various spheres in their hostlands and homelands, and the augmented, complicated and problematic situation in their hostlands, has led to an impressive increase and widening range of studies and publications on the transnationalist and diasporic phenomena at large, and of many specific transnational communities and diasporas, in particular. In this article, I will discuss the complex issue of diasporans’ cultural, social, and political integration into hostlands and its impact on diaspora-homeland relations and will then propose an analytical outline for further needed studies on the issue of diasporans’ integration and impact on their homelands.

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Introductory Comments

It is quite well known that the general public, politicians, and the media are now showing much greater interest in what are known as “transnational communities” and “diasporas”. However, as many observers have already noted, each of these types of entities constitute an extremely complex and divergent phenomenon.¹ This complexity and divergence is due to a number of basic factors: a. the fast growing numbers of such transnational communities and diasporas whose origins are different; b. the growing numbers of both their core and peripheral members. These two factors are a result of expulsions, pressures, and voluntary immigration out of recognized or perceived homeland states, or from homelands that are parts of hostile states. That massive expansion of the number of transnational and diasporic communities and of the number of their members (which is estimated at more than 400 million) contributes to these entities’ intricate situations. Now these diasporic persons and communities can be found in almost all states.

Additional factors contributing to the increasing complexity and divergence of diasporas and transnational communities are: c. their different memberships, backgrounds, and compositions; d. their social and political heterogeneity, especially of the peripheral groups of these entities; e. their different relations with their hostlands and homelands; f. their porous cultural-social-political boundaries; and g. their diverse degrees of cultural, social, political, and economic integration and autonomy in their hostlands.

Concerning the last factor, let me clarify that despite the fact that many books and articles use the terms “integration” and “assimilation” indistinguishably, here I am using the first term – integration.²

Consequently, and not surprisingly, the increase in the number of transnational and diasporic communities and of their members, their consequent growing roles and activities in various spheres in their hostlands and homelands, and the augmented,

1 On the distinction between these two kinds of entities, see my article, Sheffer, G., “Transnationalism and Ethnonational Diasporism,” *Diaspora*, 15.1, 2006, 121-146; and see, for example, Bauböck, R. and T. Faist (eds.), *Transnationalism and Diaspora: Concepts, Theories and Methods*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

2 About the concept of integration see, for example, Wieviorka, M., “The Misfortunes of Integration”, in Ben-Rafael, E. and Y. Sternberg (eds.), *Transnationalism, Diasporas and the Advent of a New (Dis) Order*, Leiden: Brill, 2009, pp. 135-148; Morwaska, E., *A Sociology of Immigration*, New York: Palgrave, 2009, pp. 18-31. The term “integration” will be defined in more detail in the section on ethno-national-religious diasporas.

complicated and problematic situation in their hostlands, has led to an impressive increase and widening range of studies and publications on the transnationalist and diasporic phenomena at large, and of many specific transnational communities and diasporas, in particular.³

There are, however, a number of gaps in this greatly expanding field of study and in the resultant vast academic literature. As far as the main theme and purpose of this article are concerned, in the existing academic studies and literature there is an interrelated shortage that this article is trying to cover: first, there are relatively few focused publications on diasporas' relations with their homelands, and second, there are relatively few publications on the impact of the integration of diasporas into their hostlands' societies and politics, as well as on their relations with their homelands. These are the two main interconnected issues discussed in this article.

More specifically, the first purpose of this article is to discuss the complex issue of diasporans' cultural, social, and political integration into hostlands and its impact on diaspora-homeland relations. This empirical part of the article will mention briefly a number of cases to illustrate the main points. The second purpose of this article is to propose an analytical outline for further needed studies on the issue of diasporans' integration and impact on their homelands.

Let me turn briefly to the analytical aspect. As mentioned in the first sentence of this article, essentially, there are two types of entities living outside of their homelands – what are known as the „transnational communities“ and what I call the „ethno-national-religious diasporas“.⁴ The most basic and significant difference between these two types is that transnational entities' members are from various ethno-national backgrounds and that they share some ideologies, including religious beliefs, purposes, and cultural characteristics. On the other hand, the members of

3 See, for example, the following recent general books dealing with the diasporic phenomenon: on transnationalism, Levitt, S. and S. Khagram, (eds.), *The Transnational Studies Reader: Intersections and Innovations*, New York: Routledge, 2007; Ben-Rafael, E. and Y. Sternberg (eds.), *Transnationalism, Diasporas and the Advent of a New (Dis) Order*, Leiden: Brill, 2009; Vertovec, S. *Transnationalism*, New York: Routledge, 2009. On diasporism, see Alfonso, C., W. Kokot, and K. Toloyan (eds.), *Diaspora, Identity and Religion, New Directions in Theory and Research*, New York: Routledge, 2004; Sheffer, G., *Diaspora Politics, At Home Abroad*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Dufoix, S., *Diasporas*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008; Esman, M., *Diasporas in the Contemporary World*, Cambridge: Polity, 2009.

4 See my book and my article on this distinction: Sheffer, G., *Diaspora Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Sheffer, G., “Transnationalism and Ethnonational Diasporism,” op. cit.

the diasporas are of the same ethno-national-religious origin. On the other hand, there are certain similarities between these two types of entities – for example, they are spread across various hostlands, their organizational structure and organizations, and their functioning in hostlands.

As mentioned, each of these types is different in various respects in addition to their varied identities. These additional differences include their historical background and their members' memories of the origins and natures of their ethnic-nation, their culture, their various groups' ideologies, the contacts that they maintain with their homelands, their various types of loyalty to their hostlands, and, very important from the viewpoint of this article, their various degrees of integration into their hostlands.

Because of these two types of entities' complicated, unclear, and problematic patterns of integration into their hostlands, and consequently their relations with their countries of origin, which will be discussed later, this article focuses only on what I have termed the "ethno-national-religious diasporas" and on the more evident real and perceived impacts of their integration in hostlands on their relations with their homelands and their consequences.

The main analytical issues and the order in which they should be discussed in further studies of diasporas' integration into their hostlands and their impact on their homelands, will be suggested in the concluding part of this article.

At this point, an important cautionary comment should be made: with regard to most of the cultural, social, political, and economic ideas and actions affecting individuals, groups, communities (including diasporas), societies, and states, it is difficult for both practitioners and analysts to accurately conclude about their real and actual impacts, and to determine exactly who and what is impacting other persons, groups, and states, and in this case especially the homelands. Thus, for example, when trying to determine the reasons for a critical decision taken by a leader, unless there is a very accurate, clear, and honest statement by this person about who and what had influenced him or her, and why he or she had made that decision, it is almost impossible to determine the issue of impact in that context. By the same token and in the context of the present article, in the case of diasporas it is very difficult, almost impossible, to accurately determine how, when, and who is impacting the homeland's society and political actors, or to say something definite about the ability of individuals and groups to cause major changes in the situation in their homeland. The most that can be made in this respect are assessments about who and why is impacting the

homeland, and why leaders, groups, or the entire nation is impacted. Accordingly, only such assessments will be presented in this empirical and analytical article.

Let me add here that the main focus of the discussion in this article is on diasporas and democratic hostlands where, in principle, diasporans can integrate and maintain close relations with their homelands. However, the nature of the regime in both homelands and hostlands is an additional factor that further complicates the discussion of the main issues that are dealt with here and should be further considered in additional detailed studies.

This is an analytical article. It is based on available literature about such diasporas, and it is just mentioning some of these entities. Thus, it is not focusing on the description and analysis of any particular diaspora, just referring to some examples. The first section of the article deals with the most essential characteristics of ethno-national-religious diasporas that help influence their relations with homelands. The second section deals with the integration issue. The third section discusses the incipient diasporas and their integration and relations with homelands. The fourth section discusses the established historical and modern stateless diasporas, their integration in hostlands and relations with homelands. The fifth section deals with established historical and modern state-linked diasporas, their degrees of integration in hostlands and consequent relations with homelands. The last section presents the empirical and analytical conclusions of this article.

The most essential characteristics of ethno-national-religious diasporas that help influence their relations with homelands

This part of the article focuses on those basic characteristics of ethno-national-religious diasporas that influence, on the one hand, their integration into their hostlands and, on the other hand, the relations with their homelands, which is one of the two main topics of the entire article.⁵

5 For slightly different full profiles of such diasporas, see Safran, W., "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," *Diaspora*, 1.1, 1991, pp. 83-99; Tololyan, K., "The Nation-State and Its Others," *Diaspora*, 1.1, 1991, pp. 3-36; Cohen, R., *Global Diasporas*, London: UCL Press, 1997; Cohen, R., "'Diaspora': Changing Meanings and Limits of the Concept" in Berthomiere, W., and C. Chivallon (eds.), *Les Diasporas dans le Monde Contemporain*, Paris: Karthala-MSHA, pp. 39-48; and see my definition/profile in Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics*, op. cit, pp. 65-98.

Since the issue of integration is much debated, let me present here a description of the term that I use: Integration is a dynamic long-term and continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation. It demands the participation not only of migrants and their descendents but of every resident in the host country. The integration process involves adaptation by the migrants who have rights and responsibilities in relation to their hostland. It involves, of course, the hostland society and government, which should create the proper opportunities for the migrants' full cultural, social, political, and economic participation. There are degrees of integration that will be discussed later in this article.

Generally, as briefly mentioned, I define these diasporas as cultural-social-political-economic entities that actually share the same ethno-national identity and identification. In some of these cases religion serves as an intensification factor of the diasporas' ethno-national identity and identification. Furthermore, the members of these diasporas are usually permanent residents in one or a number of hostlands. There used to be diasporas that resided only in one host country, but eventually most diasporas scattered to a number of other host countries. This has been the case, for example, with the Mexicans. They began their emigration from Mexico and settled mainly in the United States. More recently, however, Mexicans are migrating from the United States and settling in Canada and other hostlands.⁶ When they are scattered in more than one hostland it is easier for these diasporas to maintain their constant relations and contacts with the homeland. This is the case since it is easier for the members of the entire diaspora to escape the limitations imposed on them by one or more hostlands.

In this context it should be noted that people whose origin is in an ethno-national homeland that has been divided by adjacent states that occupy parts of it, and therefore are residents of those states adjacent to their homeland, should not be regarded as diasporans. The main reasons for their exclusion from the diasporic category are that they have not migrated and they have maintained close relations with their homelands. This, for example, applies to Hungarians residing in countries neighboring Hungary, and to the Palestinians living in the Israeli occupied territories and in Jordan.

Despite many states' recent enhanced control over their boundaries, and the limitations they succeed in imposing on the immigration of „others“ to their territories,

6 Esman, M., *Diasporas in the Contemporary World*, op. cit, pp. 88-99; Escobar Latapi, A. and E. Janssen, "Migration, the Diaspora and Development: The Case of Mexico," Discussion Paper, International Institute for Labor Studies, 2006.

due to the massive reawakening of nationalism and ethnicity, and the acceptance of the notion and practice of ethnic diversity by many hostlands and homelands, the numbers of such ethno-national-religious diasporans and diasporas are increasing quite dramatically. Consequently, in addition to the existence of *incipient* and *established* historical diasporas, clear reawakening processes have also occurred among what have been regarded as diasporas fully integrated into their hostlands.⁷ This is, for example, the case with many Scandinavians, especially Swedish-Americans in the United States. Recently, many Swedish-Americans, who had been regarded as fully integrated into the American society and most of whom have totally abandoned their Swedish identity and become absolute Americans, are actually reviving parts of their Swedish identity and patterns of behavior. Consequently, they are intensifying their connections and expanding their relations with their respective homelands.⁸ Thus, as far as this article is concerned, these cases are very interesting. The question asked in this context is: to what extent can such diasporas influence the policies and behavior of their „newly rediscovered“ homelands?

In any event, members of ethno-national-religious diasporas maintain identities that are based on non-essentialist primordial elements. In this context, non-essentialism means that their identity is not completely or only based on genetic ethnic elements (I will deal with the genetic issue later in this article). Primordialism (or Perennialism) is the idea that nations and therefore their diasporas are “natural” ancient or modern entities. In the context of the discussion in this article, it more specifically means that such diasporans maintain elements of identity that are based on their historical memories of their entire ethno-national group. Moreover, the main elements of their primordial identities include legends or real stories about the founding fathers of their nation; memories about the entire history of the nation; myths and facts about the homeland and the people who were and are living there; the adoption and maintenance of joint historical cultural and behavioral patterns, such as observing holidays, consuming “national food”, and wearing national dress; psychological factors that create a desire to maintain belonging in and connections with the homeland and the nation; and emotional and practical interests that can be achieved as a

7 It should be noted that when using the term “integration” in this article the meaning is not total assimilation in the sense of absolute desertion of the original world-nation of the diasporans and becoming full members of the hostland society in all respects.

8 See, for example, *American-Swedish Handbook*, Minneapolis MN: Swedish Council of America, 2004; Barton, A., *Essays on Swedes and America*, Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2007.

result of maintaining connections with their kin, and which are related to their homeland. It does not mean that all the specific primordial elements mentioned above are shared by all diasporas, but the fact of the matter is that most of these elements exist, and these influence the identities of all ethno-ethnic diasporic entities.

Furthermore, a growing number of analysts argue that the genetic factors, which are shared mainly by the core persons affiliated with the diaspora, contribute to a continued unending membership in such diasporas. Thus, there are recent studies that point out that the genetic factor determines the belonging and the identity of most members of such diasporas, and hence their continued relations with the same ethno-national entities. Such are the cases of most of the Jews, Palestinians, and Armenians who are members of their diasporas.⁹ This still somewhat debatable factor makes absolute integration into hostlands and ultimate change of their identity rather difficult, on the one hand, and connections with the homeland more continuous, on the other.

Based on their common identity, dedicated members of such diasporas invest emotions and activities in maintaining and promoting communal solidarity and cohesion. Such solidarity is one of the main bases determining diasporas' cultural, social, political, and economic non-geographic boundaries, cohesion, solidarity, and mutual activities. However, in view of current processes of intensive integration into hostlands and in certain cases the total "desertion" from the diasporic entity, which will be discussed later, maintenance of boundaries by diasporans and their organizations is an extremely significant but difficult issue for most diasporas and diasporans. The endeavors to maintain those boundaries are connected to the hard work of individuals, families, small groups, and larger diasporic communities in organizing meetings, communications with their co-diasporans and with the people in their homeland, contacts with all involved persons and groups, and educational projects. These

9 About the genetic factor see for example: Goldstein, D., *Jacob's Legacy: A Genetic View of Jewish History*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009; Entine, J., *Abraham's Children: Race Identity and DNA of Chosen People*, Boston, MA: Grand Central Publishing, 2007; Kleiman, Y., *DNA and Tradition: The Genetic Link to the Ancient Hebrews*, Manchester, UK: Devora Publishing, 2004; Cavalli-Sforza, L., *Genes, People, and Languages*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; Cavalli-Sforza, L. and F. Cavally-Sforza, *The Great Human Diasporas: the History of Diversity and Evolution*, Jackson, TN: Perseus Books, 1996. Geertz, C., 1963: "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in C. Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, Free Press: New York, pp. 107-113.

days most diasporas perform these tasks. It applies, for example, to the Armenian, Ukrainian, Palestinian, Lebanese, Jamaican, Nigerian, and Afghani diasporas.¹⁰

As said before, despite such attempts to defend and promote communal solidarity and cohesion, partly through their organizations in hostlands that are supported by various sectors in their homelands, these diasporas are far from being homogeneous entities. While various publications on diasporas regard each of these entities as one entirely homogeneous unit, in fact, in each of these diasporas one can easily identify a *core* and *peripheries*. The cores of these diasporas are composed of people who strictly maintain their ethno-national-religious identity and openly identify themselves as entirely belonging to the same ethno-national-religious diasporic entity. Consequently, while these core persons are citizens of their hostlands, have integrated in these hostlands and in many cases show basic loyalty to these states, they still define and identify themselves as members of the relevant ethno-national-religious entity. The peripheral diasporans, who are more fully integrated into their hostlands, have fewer commitments to other members of the diaspora and to the homeland.¹¹

It is easy to understand that integration can reduce diasporans' identification with the diaspora and with the homeland, and thus their wish and attempts to influence what is happening in their homelands. Moreover, it has been noted that even each of the cores and peripheries of diasporas are not homogeneous groups. While most of them would self-identify themselves as members of a diaspora, only from this viewpoint can they be regarded as homogeneous groups. Nevertheless, usually these are heterogeneous groups from the religious, ideological, and practical perspectives. Thus, for example, even the Jews, who are widely regarded and treated as an entirely homogeneous entity, demonstrate remarkable differences from this point of view.

10 The literature on this issue is huge. See, for example: Satzewick, V., *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, New York: Routledge, 2003; "The Role of the Palestinian Diaspora in the Rehabilitation and Development in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," October 2004, <http://www.escwa.un.org>; Garabet, A., "The Lebanese Diaspora," March, 2007, <http://www.iloubnan.info>; Best, T., "Jamaica Consulate in NY: Organizing a Community, Tapping into the Diaspora Through High Technology," *Carib News*, 3 Nov. 2009; Ukanda, H., "The Nigerian Diaspora and the New Face of Nigeria," Feb. 2008, <http://globalpolitics.com>; "Proposals to create a Framework Uniting Diaspora Armenians," Feb. 2010, <http://www.haym.org>; Zotova, N., "Afghanis in Russia: Close-knit International Diaspora," <http://enews.ferghana.ru>

11 See, for example, the discussion on the various levels of integration in chapter 4, in Morawska, E., *A Sociology of Immigration*, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, pp. 113-151; and chapter 3 in Vertovec, op. cit.

Even among the core members of this Diaspora, there are ultra-Orthodox, Orthodox, Secular, Atheists, Leftists, Rightists, Jews of Oriental background vs. Jews of European background, rich and poor Jews, Zionists and post-Zionists, etc., etc.¹²

Despite their social, political, and economic heterogeneity, core members of such entities continuously maintain or revive their original ethno-national identity, and these days they are not very ashamed or afraid to identify as such. An important element that contributes to the maintenance of their ethno-national identity and their willingness to identify as such is their fairly regular contacts of various types with their homelands, whether or not these are independent states. These contacts can be performed through a number of strategic decisions by diasporic individuals and groups: by a total return to their homeland, regular visits to the homeland, remittances and investments there, political and diplomatic support, participation in activities organized by the representatives of their homelands in their countries of residence, etc.

For these purposes diasporans create elaborate transstate and intrastate networks. Intrastate networks are created and performed to facilitate easy connections between the geographically dispersed people inside their hostland. The transstate networks are created to enable communication with the homeland and with other diasporic communities of the same ethno-national-religious origin that reside in other hostlands. These networks use both „older“ and current means of communication, such as mail, telephones, Internet, and various means of transportation.¹³ Thus, for example, the number of Internet sites that are run by Jewish, Palestinian, Basque, and Armenian diasporic individuals, groups, and organizations is vast. All these means of communication enable and encourage multiple exchanges of cultural features, social patterns, political ideas, and economic cooperation with their homelands and with other segments of the diaspora wherever these exist. These are, of course, significant means for potentially influencing what is going on in their homelands.

Furthermore, these communication networks facilitate the creation of organizations and their activities in the cultural, social, economic, and political spheres. As I have noted in most of my publications on diasporas, organizations are very significant factors in diasporas' existence, activities, and relations with hostlands and home-

12 See, for example, DellaPergola, S., and U. Rebhun (eds.), *Contemporary Jewry*, Special Issue: *Jewish Population Studies*, Dordrecht, Springer, 29.2, 2009, p. 100.

13 See for example, Dahan, M., and G. Sheffer, "Ethnic Groups and Distance Shrinking Communication Technologies," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 7.1, 2001, pp. 85-107; Brinkerhoff, J., *Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

lands.¹⁴ There is no doubt that the attitudes and activities of individual diasporans are the very basic requirements for maintaining the entity; however, from a wider and more substantial perspective, organizations are the real instruments that hold these entities together.

In turn, rather than the activities of individual diasporans, the policies and actual activities of diasporic organizations mostly create the potential for on the one hand, cooperation, and on the other hand, friction with both homelands and hostlands. Actual activities of diasporic organizations contribute to the general circumstances affecting the diasporas in hostlands and homelands with which such diasporas have to deal, and there are multiple reasons for such controversies and clashes. More specifically, these processes and events are related to highly complex patterns of *one-sided, divided, dual, or ambiguous* loyalties to homeland and hostland. One-sided loyalty is complete loyalty to either the homeland or the hostland. Divided loyalty is diasporans' attempts to somehow balance their loyalties to their hostland and homeland. Dual loyalty means that there is no separation between these two types of loyalties; that is, diasporans treat their homeland and hostland in the same spirit and fashion. This latter pattern may cause ambiguity concerning which loyalty comes first. This form also means that the diasporans are not anxious to disclose to whom they are more loyal, to their homeland or hostland.¹⁵

All those factors have various impacts on the main views and actions adopted and implemented by individual diasporans and by all diasporic entities, including their attempt to shape the main developments in their homelands. From the diasporans' perspective, there is a whole spectrum of strategies that they use for coping with their complex situations in their hostlands, which in certain cases overlap, and with their attempt to impact significant developments in their homelands.

The integration issue

The strategies that individual diasporans use in their relations with their homelands and hostlands are very strongly influenced by their social, political, and economic degree of integration within their hostland. In view of the above-mentioned great

14 See for example, Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics*, op. cit.

15 For a further discussion of the issue of diasporas' loyalties, see chapter 9 in Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics*, 2006, pp. 219-238.

heterogeneity of these entities, there are degrees of integration that range from full to partial.¹⁶ There is of course a difference between various degrees of partial and full integration into hostlands. The latter means total abandonment of the ethno-national identity and of membership in the established diaspora, on the one hand, and full acceptance of the national, cultural, and social identity of the hostland, on the other hand. Yet, as, for example, the recent census in the United States has shown, even some of those who regard themselves, or have been and are regarded by others, as fully integrated persons in their hostland maintain some knowledge and feelings about their ethno-national origin and about the situation in their homelands. Most of these persons are not active members of a diasporic entity; however, new trends are emerging among some of these people. These people try, and some succeed, in renewing their contacts with both their emerging or reemerging diasporas and their homelands.¹⁷ At the other end of this spectrum, partial integration is the strategy of most of the core members. These people accept most of the rules of the game in their hostlands, they try to behave as other citizens there, but they maintain a degree of cultural, social, and political separation from the rest of the society in their hostland. Once again, there is a variety of positions and behavioral patterns among the people belonging to this category. However, usually there are very few diasporans who are totally estranged and disloyal to their hostlands.

The following are the main strategies that organized diasporic entities adopt in their hostlands concerning their positions there that impact both their integration in hostlands and their connections with their homelands. These include: a) *Communalism* – this means that certain diasporas are maintaining themselves as separate entities within their hostlands with relatively clearly drawn non-geographic boundaries, but at the same time they are involved in various degrees of social and political integration into their hostlands. The most relevant examples of diasporas that fit this category are the Moroccans in Germany, the Algerians in France, the Palestinians

16 On the concept of integration and the difficulties involved in its study in the context of the study of the diaspora phenomenon see, for example, Wieviorka, M., “The misfortunes of Integration,” in Ben-Rafael and Sternberg, *Transnationalism*, op. cit., pp. 135-148; Morwaska, *A Sociology of Immigration*, op. cit., pp. 113-151. For general discussions of the patterns of integration see, for example, Morwaska, E., “The Sociology and Historiography of Immigration”, in Yans-McLaughlin, V., (ed.), *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology and Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 187-239; Foner, N., *In a New Land: A Comparative View of Immigration*, New York: New York University Press, 2005.

17 First Ancestry Reported, 2006, US Census Bureau, American Community Survey.

in various states, and the Turks in Western Europe;¹⁸ b) *Corporatism* – developing or maintaining representative organizations that are officially recognized by hostlands' social-political systems, including of course the hostlands' governments. Though these are not the only cases, the well-known cases in this category are the Jewish entities in Britain and France, and some Roma communities in Britain, France, and Spain;¹⁹ c) *Autonomism* – achieving and maintaining a certain degree of integration into hostlands, but acting primarily in accordance with their own cultural, social, political, and economic backgrounds and interests. This is the case with most of the historical and modern established diasporas; d) *Isolation* – though behaving according to the laws and patterns of behavior of the hostland, the diasporas are preserving clear ethno-national-cultural boundaries and showing self-sufficiency in achieving their wishes and satisfying their interests. For example, this is the case with the Amish Diaspora in Canada and the United States.²⁰

Most organized ethno-national diasporas select and adopt a combined integrative and communalist strategy. Typically, the majority of the core members of these diasporas behave according to the relevant rules of both homeland and hostland, and at the same time they promote their own views and their interests in their homelands, hostlands, and the international system.

Based on the comprehensive profile presented above, the following are the most significant factors that are related to and influence the integration of the diasporas into their hostlands,²¹ which in turn influence their relations with homelands:

a) Most important is the actual degree of maintenance of their ethno-national-religious identity and their willingness and ability to identify as members of a diaspora.

18 On the general issue see, for example, Jackson-Preece, J., *Minority Rights: Between Diversity and Community*, Cambridge: Polity, 2005. On the various cases mentioned in the text see, for example, Manco, U., *Turks in Western Europe*, <http://www.flw.ugent.be>; Schutter, K., 'The Moroccan Diaspora in Germany', Economic Development and Employment Division, Migration and Development Sector Project, <http://www.gtz.de>; 'Algeria Reaches out to Expatriate Community', March 2009, <http://www.magharebia.com>; Werbner, P., *Pakistani Migration and Diaspora: Religious Politics in a Global Age*, *Encyclopedia of Diasporas*, New York: Springer US, 2005, pp. 475-484; Silverstein, P., *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race and Nation*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004; Lindholm-Schultz, H. and J. Hammer, *The Palestinian Diaspora*, New York: Routledge, 2003.

19 Mirga, A., and N. Gheorge, *The Roma in the 21st Century: A Policy Paper*, Princeton Policy Project on Ethnic Relations, 1997.

20 Hostetler, J., *Amish Society*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.

21 Compare the following factors with the analyses by Morwaska, *op. cit.* chapter 4; and Ben-Rafael, "Multiple Transnationalisms: Muslims, Africans, Chinese and Hispanics," in Ben-Rafael, *op. cit.*, pp. 643-646.

The more they maintain their original identity, the more easily they can partly integrate into their hostlands and still maintain their connections with their homeland;

b) The maintenance of the ethno-national cultural-social-religious boundaries, which are protected by highly developed and effective diasporic organizations and networks. Thus, not only identity and identification are critical elements in preventing full maximal integration; what is also needed is the intention and actual capability to maintain the borders of these entities and to support and be active in the diasporic organizations that in turn help the individuals and various groups to exist and be active. Thus, not only the abstract ideas and views but also the actual practical factors are significant in this context;

c) In order for the active diasporic individuals and organizations to have any impact on their homelands, they must demonstrate a considerable degree of loyalty to their homelands;

d) The strategic and tactical policies that are implemented and have actual positive or negative inputs to their four-sided connections with homelands, hostlands, international organizations, and brethren residing in other hostlands, may have either positive or negative influence on the developments in each of these entities and on their relations with their homelands.

e) Hostlands' attitudes towards immigrants and diasporas in general, and especially actual approaches, policies, and actions with regard to the immigrants' and diasporans' integration into the hostland culture, society, politics, and economics.

To all these factors, the relations between a hostland and a homeland should be added. When the relations between these states are friendly or reasonable, the diaspora would have relative freedom of action vis-à-vis their homeland. When the relations between the homeland and hostland are problematic and tense, the diaspora would face dilemmas and then great difficulties concerning their loyalty and activities.

Two further significant distinctions between the various ethno-national-religious diasporas are relevant to the discussion here. The first distinction is that between *recent incipient* and *historical and modern established diasporas*. *Incipient diasporas* are those entities composed of very recent migrants that are currently in the midst of the processes of developing the above-mentioned five main elements of their identity and their actual activities. For example, the Mexicans and some South Americans are especially involved in formulating their entity's identity, defining their boundaries, determining their strategies vis-à-vis their homelands and hostlands, and establishing and arranging their organizations. The *historical and modern diasporas* are those entities that have been formed either in the far past, such as the Jewish and Armenian

diasporas, or in modern times, such as the Italian and Irish diasporas. These are well-structured and regularly operating entities in various hostlands.

The second distinction that should also be remembered in this context is that between *state-linked* and *stateless diasporas*. Most of the incipient and established diasporas are state-linked. However, there are still a number of diasporas that are not connected to a nation-state, but maintain close contacts with individuals and groups in the territories that they regard as their homeland. The most obvious case is that of the Roma and other Gypsy groups. However, the Palestinian and Kurdish diasporas also belong to this category.

A final comment in connection with the discussion above is that, despite certain similarities between transnational communities and ethno-national diasporas, the characteristics of the ethno-national diasporas that have been discussed above sharpen the differences between those two types of entities,²² and clarifies the discussion of diasporas' integration in their hostlands and their relations with their homelands. In any case, there is a growing agreement between scholars and other analysts that transnational and diasporic entities should be discussed separately.²³

Incipient diasporas and their integration and relations with homelands

The majority of the people who „belong“ to incipient diasporas are first generation migrants, or at most second generation former migrants who are permanent residents in their hostlands. Because of the current much easier movement from country to country and because of the lack of clearly demonstrated abilities of governments to totally seal off their geographic boundaries, the numbers of incipient diasporas is increasing quite rapidly.

22 Sheffer, G., “Transnationalism and Ethnonational Diasporas,” *Diaspora*, 15.1, 2006, pp. 121-145.

23 Braziel, J., and A. Mannur, *Theorizing Diaspora: A Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003; Levy, A. and A. Weingrod, *Homelands and Diasporas, Holy Lands and Other Places*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004; Lyons, T., “Diasporas and Conflict,” *Global Studies Review*, 2.3, 2006, pp. 1-3; Glick Schiller, N., “The Centrality of Ethnography in the Study of Transnational Migration,” in Foner, N. (ed.), *American Arrivals: Anthropology Engages the New Immigration*, Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research, 2003, pp. 99-128; Safran, W., “Comparing Visions of the Nation,” in Young, M., E. Zuelow, and A. Sturm (eds.), *Nationalism in a Global Era, The Persistence of Nations*, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 33-54.

The majority of such recent migrants either join existing organized diasporas in hostlands, for example, the new waves of Mexicans in the United States, or they are active in organizing coherent diasporic entities, this is the case, for example, with the Filipino, Korean, and Sudanese entities in various Middle Eastern countries. Because of the recent arrival of so many migrants, their prolonged and close ties with their families and social groups in their homelands, their commitment to the emergence of the incipient diasporic entities, and the continuation of the formation of these diasporas, most of them are very partially integrated into their hostlands.

During the first period of their stay in the hostland, such new migrants usually maintain their ethno-national identity, and in an interconnected fashion they also carry on their „old“ cultural patterns of thinking and behavior. This pattern is partly caused by the fact that many such migrants are not acquainted with the culture or the social-political environment, and they do not speak the local languages. Therefore, their ability to integrate well into their hostland societies during the first phases of their residence in their new hostlands is limited and sometimes even almost impossible.

An additional significant aspect of the migrants' continued commitment to their ethno-national entities, and consequently of their difficulties in integrating into their hostlands, is these societies' and their governments' hostile attitudes and activities vis-à-vis many new migrants. There is plenty of evidence that even when the general social and political rhetoric in hostlands is not antagonistic to the immigrants, de facto they are not welcomed and their integration is problematic. This is the case in some Western European states and to a degree also in the United States. In cases where migrants are welcomed despite these general, new, somewhat hostile attitudes, the demand would be that they should fully adjust to the laws and rules of the hostland and that eventually they should fully or largely integrate there. It actually means that these hostlands' actual expectations and demands are that the favored diasporans should gradually begin to relinquish their original identity, agree to forget about their ethno-national origin, and become totally loyal to the hostland. Even when such migrants are inclined to do so in the long run, in most cases their actual immediate integration is slow and difficult.²⁴

Due to the fact that during their initial period in the hostland, many members of incipient stateless diasporas are in most cases only partially integrated into their hostlands, and because of their initial views and interests, and their main cultural,

24 See Morwaska, op. cit.; Ben-Rafael, op. cit.

social, and political loyalties, they remain loyal to their homelands to a degree. Thus, they maintain close connections with their kin, other groups, governmental agencies, and NGOs in their homelands. In turn, as should be expected, these diasporans' continued loyalty and connections to their homelands slows their partial and certainly their full integration in their hostland. Based on this analysis, the general conclusion here is that as a result of these parallel patterns of behavior, a lot depends on hostlands' willingness and encouragement in promoting these peoples' integration.

The following are the main reasons why members of incipient diasporas maintain close relations with their homelands, which complicates their gradual full or partial integration into their hostlands. The first reason is that such diasporans attempt to ensure an easy possibility of return to their homeland. This is connected to their position in both hostland and homeland. As mentioned above, such migrants' inclination to leave the hostland and return to their homeland is either a result of a basic ethno-national dream or of actual immediate needs and interests of the migrants. The first reason for their inherent wish to go back to the homeland is connected to the migrants' sense of permanent belonging to that ethno-national home. At the same time, the actual or potential wish to return to the homeland is a result of hostile attitudes and actions by the hostland society or political system. The second reason is the close relations, mainly with their kin or close social groups, in the homeland and the impulse to continue pursuing these relations. The third reason that prevents rapid and full integration into their hostlands is the economic aspect. The initial form of interaction between the migrants and the people in their "original home" is, again, the need and wish to transfer remittances to their kin. This involvement in improving the economic situation of their kin and close friends at home means investment of time and energy in this sphere of activity, which again disturbs rapid integration into the hostland. At a later stage, when the migrants succeed in accumulating financial resources, many of them are inclined not only to transfer remittances but also to invest in their homelands rather than in their hostlands. This is an additional reason for the relatively limited investment of time and resources in fast integration in the hostland and in its economy. For example, these factors apply to most of the very recent waves of migrants from East Asia, such as the Filipinos, Koreans, and Taiwanese.²⁵

25 See, for example, Kwong, P. and D. Misevic, *Chinese America: The Untold Story of America's Oldest New Community*, New York: New Press, 2005; Saxenian, A., *The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006; Watres, M., and R. Ueda (eds.), *The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration*

The connections and involvements of new migrants with criminal organizations originating in their homelands is not a new phenomenon. Many incipient diasporas have been involved in establishing and maintaining such networks. Yet, recently this has become an increasing and widening development. This growing phenomenon applies to members of all types of ethno-national diasporas that are discussed here. This development is connected to a number of factors: the wish and need to smuggle men and women to hostlands for various purposes and as a source of income for many diasporans in hostlands and for their kin in homelands; drug smuggling; illegal financial transactions, etc. In certain cases of incipient diasporas, drug smuggling and sales are related not only to meeting their own needs in their hostland, but to the wish to finance their families and kin in the homeland, as well as terrorist activities that are part of the struggle of diasporans and their kin in homelands to achieve religious and national purposes.²⁶ There is almost no need to mention that this development also impacts the difficulty of full integration in hostlands and subsequently the diasporas' continued involvement in their homelands.

Because of their precarious situation in many hostlands, their uncertain permanent residence in their current hostlands, the above-mentioned possibility of their return to their homeland, and their dependence on relevant persons, groups, organizations, and institutes in their homelands for their security, the ability of *state-linked incipient* diasporas to impact the cultural, social, and economic spheres in their homelands is limited. The main sphere in their homeland that they may have an effect on is probably economic. This ability emerges in homelands that experience a problematic economic situation (which incidentally encourages individuals and groups to emigrate from their homelands), where members of the diaspora assist via their remittances and initial investments in their homelands.

In an interconnected manner, because of their experience and involvement in the following spheres while they have been residents in hostlands, returnees from incipient diasporas to their homelands may affect their homelands especially in the economic, industrial, and scientific spheres. They may also have some effect on changes in the social behavior of their people in the homeland. In this respect their influence may especially be felt in the adoption of new communication practices and

Since 1965, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007; Min, P. (ed.), *Asian Americans: Contemporary Trends and Issues*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2006; Espiritu, Y., *Home Bound: Filipino American Lives Across Cultures, Communities and Countries*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003; Yu, E., "Emerging Diversity in LA Koreatown," *American Journal*, 30.1, 2004, pp. 25-52.

²⁶ *Narco-Terrorism*, Two CD-Ram Set, US Government, 2008.

behavioral patterns that they “import” from their hostlands, especially when these are democracies.

On the other hand, the attempts and ability of *stateless incipient diasporas* to become involved in political developments in their imagined homelands are somewhat greater than the ability of state-linked diasporas to do so. In these cases the dependence of such depressed ethno-national groups in the homelands on the relevant diasporas may be an essential factor for both groups. From the incipient diaspora’s viewpoint, quite often there is a strong wish to help the people in the homeland to achieve independence and sovereignty. In most cases, these diasporans are committed to helping their relatives and associates achieve that independence in order to free the ethno-national group from the rule of another ethno-national group and liberate their homeland.²⁷ At the same time, they believe and hope that achieving this goal would improve the situation of the entire ethno-national entity, that is, both in the homeland itself and in the diaspora.

The fact is that a state-linked diaspora’s position in hostlands is better when they are supported by the homeland. However, stateless diasporas are more involved in their homelands’ affairs. Such diasporans usually help people in the homeland by supplying financial means and manpower recruitment to help them conduct the struggle for independence whenever it occurs, as well as political and diplomatic lobbying, and multiple means for supporting terrorism and semi-military activities in the homeland that are intended to achieve independence and sovereignty there. The Jewish Diaspora’s role in the struggle for the establishment of an independent Israel, the Tamil diaspora support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s fight for independence in Sri Lanka, the Serbian and Croatian diasporic entities’ support of their brethren in their fight for independence, and the Palestinian diasporans who are supporting the PLO and Hamas in their fights for independence, are all relevant examples in this respect.

Generally speaking, unlike the situation in earlier periods of the 20th century, now most homelands are showing interest in “their” diasporas. The governments of many states have established special ministries or agencies to deal with these incipi-

27 For a general discussion of this kind of involvement and activities see, for example: Horowitz, D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000; Smith, H., and P. Stares (eds.), *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace Makers or Peace Wreckers?* Tokyo: UN University Press, 2007; Baser, B. and A. Swain, “Diasporas as Peace Makers: Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts,” *International Journal on World Peace*, xxv.3, September 2008.

ent diasporas. This has been the case with newer and less established homelands such as Armenia, Georgia, and no fewer than fifteen African states that have established such ministries or agencies for dealing with their incipient and established diasporas.²⁸ Some states have established special financial facilities to make the transfer of diasporic remittances and investments to them easier. Most of the time these homelands' ministries, embassies, and their other representatives in hostlands are involved in various ideational, cultural, social, political, and economic aspects of the diasporas' existence in hostlands. Again, because of their precarious existence in many hostlands, such diasporans are dependent on their homelands, which take advantage of this situation to promote their own interests. Unfortunately for the diasporans, the interests of their homelands do not always fit their own needs and wishes.

In sum, in most of the current cases of incipient entities, especially when these diasporas are state-linked, there is an asymmetry between the positions and capabilities of homelands and of these diasporas in the two-sided attempts to impact developments on the other side of the same nation. In most of these cases, rather than the diasporas, the homelands' societies, governments, and agencies are more capable and effective in influencing the diasporas.²⁹ Generally, such diasporas' abilities to influence developments in their homelands are quite restricted. On the other hand, part of the attempts of homelands to control their diasporas is to reduce their members' wish to integrate into their hostlands.

Established historical and modern stateless diasporas, their integration in hostlands and relations with homelands

The core members of established historical and modern stateless diasporas (not the incipient diasporas discussed above) and especially their organizations, are the most involved entities in the various events in their homelands. The most outstanding established diasporas in this category that were involved in the struggles for the establishment of an independent sovereign state in their homelands were the Jewish Diaspora, and, more recently, the Armenian, Palestinian, Basque, Albanian Kosovar,

28 About the establishment of the fifteen ministries in Africa, see Mohamoud, A., *The EU, the African Diaspora in Europe and its Impact on Democracy Building in Africa*, International IDEA, 2009, <http://www.Diaspora-Center.org>

29 Compare with Morwaska, op. cit., chapter 5.

and Kurdish diasporas.³⁰ This involvement occurred and is still occurring regardless of these diasporas' integration, to varying degrees, into their hostlands.

Generally speaking, more frequently than in the cases of other types of diasporas, usually the peripheral members of the entities discussed in this part of the article are less involved in what is happening in their countries of origin. Unlike the peripheral members of stateless diasporas, until the establishment of their independent states, the core members of these diasporas are pretty much involved in what is happening in their homelands. In certain cases their involvement in such developments in their homelands surpasses their interest and involvement in their hostlands.

These diasporans are particularly engaged in helping the people in their homeland in their struggles to achieve independence and sovereignty for their homelands. Moreover, during the struggles for establishing or reviving independent nation-states, these diasporans and their organizations are more radical in their views, hopes, and demands in comparison with the people in their homeland. In many cases such diasporans push the people in the homeland to launch a dedicated and active struggle. They promise and try their best to provide financial, political diplomatic, and manpower aid, as well as weapons and support for terrorist activities in the homelands. Based on my own experience in "mediating" between American-Basques and Basque activists in their homeland, and between the American-Albanian Kosovars and the people in Kosovo, and from my first-hand knowledge of the relationships between American-Armenians and the people in their homeland, and of Palestinians in the West Bank and in the United States, in all these cases, certain groups in the diasporas were by far more radical than the people in the homelands.

On the other hand, in all these cases the active people in the homelands expect the core diasporans to act unambiguously and profoundly on their behalf. The idea behind this notion and approach of reliance on the diaspora is that while the people in the homeland are under the rule of different hostile ethnic groups and governments, the people in the diaspora have greater freedom of manoeuvrability and action, particularly when their hostland society and government are opposed to the government and society in the homeland.

However, even in these cases, because of the long perceptual and geographic distances between a stateless diaspora and its homeland, the intensity of the impacts of the diasporas' views and activities on the people in the homeland are not at all clear.

30 See for example, Lyons, T., "Diasporas and Conflicts," *Global Studies Review*, 2.3, Fall 2006.

Because of the fuller integration of these diasporas in their hostlands in comparison to incipient diasporas, among the politicians and other activists in their homelands there is a degree of suspicion and uneasiness about their possible and actual influence. This is the case especially during the initial stages after the struggle for independence in the homeland. The fear is that the diaspora may “export” and “implant” cultural-social-political patterns of their hostlands’ culture and social structure to which the diaspora adjusted and live accordingly. Nevertheless, as in the cases of the incipient stateless diasporas, in the cases of the established stateless diasporas, the diasporans have some impact on the developments among their kin in the homeland.

When the joint struggle of the diaspora and the people in the homeland is successful, then after the achievement of independence in the homeland, relying on their contribution to that achievement, the diasporans would try to continue to influence the cultural, social, political, and economic developments in their homeland. The main purposes of such attempts are to ensure their acquired positive and influential place in the entire nation, to ensure continued cooperation between the diaspora and homeland, and, in the relevant cases, to create the background for maintenance of close relations between the homeland and the supportive hostlands where the diasporans reside.

However, when the situation in the homeland becomes stable, when the people there recuperate from the struggle for independence and try to build up the state and the nation according to their own views and purposes, these diasporas’ involvement in what occurs in the homeland would become similar to the struggles and efforts of state-linked ethno-national diasporas to influence what is happening in their homelands. However, as mentioned, usually their influence on the homelands is declining. Part of this process is related to the homeland’s persistent demand that the diaspora should continue to be loyal to the homeland, that the diaspora should recognize the homeland’s centrality in the nation, that the diaspora should only support the homeland in every sense, and that some of the diasporans should return to the homeland to assist in the further steps taken for state building. The Israeli and Jewish case supplies the most obvious evidence of this pattern.

Established historical and modern state-linked diasporas, their degrees of integration in hostlands and consequent relations with homelands

It must be emphasized again that as far as their identity, identification, and integration patterns in hostlands and their connections to homelands are concerned, there is substantial similarity between the cores of various established modern and historical state-linked diasporas. As noted above, they basically maintain their ethno-national identity; in most cases they identify as members of their diasporas, they only partly integrate into their hostlands' culture, society, and politics, and they maintain contacts with their homelands and support them.

However, unlike the situation of most members of incipient diasporas, who are generally far from being fully integrated into their hostlands, among the members of established historical and modern diasporas there are visible differences between the cores and peripheries of these entities. In fact, the various peripheries in these diasporas can be differentiated mainly according to their degrees of integration into their hostlands' cultures, societies, politics, and economics. Here it should also be noted again that each group in these diasporas is not homogeneous but heterogeneous. That is, different peripheral groups demonstrate different feelings and loyalties toward their hostlands and homelands. Furthermore, the fully integrated peripheral groups are only very marginally connected to the entire diaspora and by the same token also to the homeland.

On the other hand, quite naturally, the various integrated peripheries' loyalties are first and foremost to the hostland's society and political system. Their loyalty to their "homeland" is partial, and at times even very partial. Therefore, their involvement in what is happening in the diaspora's old country of origin is pretty limited. At most, they show some interest in what happens in these countries, and probably they extend some help to these homelands when these states are involved in severe crises. Some of these peripheral individuals and groups might be asked by either their brethren in the hostland or homeland to try and influence their hostland's policies and actions vis-à-vis the homeland. Even then, usually the "investment" of these individuals and groups is rather limited. Hence, their influence on the developments in these countries is rather limited too. Only when they change their basic attitude and become more dedicated to the diaspora and more interested in the homeland might their influence increase. But, until such groups clearly demonstrate their renewed ties to the diaspora and homeland, the core members and the people in the homeland might

show reservations and suspicion about the sincerity of these persons and reject their involvement.

Despite their ethno-national identity and identification, the situation of the core members of these diasporas concerning their relations with the homeland is also complicated and not always clear. This is the case because even the existing and growing cores of such diasporas exhibit dual loyalties to homeland and hostland.³¹ There are many reasons for this situation, such as the effects of even their limited cultural integration into their hostland, their socio-political inertia, and the tensions between them and certain social individuals and groups in their homeland. But the main reason for such limited influence is, of course, their need to ensure and secure their existence in their hostland. In cases where and when the diasporans show full loyalty only to either the hostland or homeland, their position, even in democratic hostlands, would become highly problematic and even dangerous. In cases of diasporans' complete loyalty to the homeland, the hostland society and government, again even in democracies, would regard them as defectors and collaborators with the homeland and therefore would put powerful pressure on them and even threaten that they would be exiled. This is especially the case when hostland and homeland relations are problematic and when there are ongoing conflicts between such states.

In fact, only very few individuals, small groups, and organizations of the core members of these entities exhibit full loyalty to their homeland. Such individuals, groups, and organizations cooperate with friendly homeland societies, agencies, organizations, and governments. At the same time, when core diasporans show full loyalty to their hostland, the homeland society and government may boycott them and make great efforts to reduce to a minimum their connections with the homeland.

Yet, when severe internal cultural, social, political, and economic disarrays, conflicts, and clashes within a homeland state occur, its diasporans will try to intervene and influence the developments there in order to manage or solve the conflicts. This intervention in the homeland's affairs is easier when there are no conflicts and disagreements between the homeland and hostland. For example, this has been the case with the Irish, Iranian, Iraqi, White South-African, and Israeli diasporas. However, even in these cases, whom and to what extent diasporans would be effective in influencing regarding major developments in their homelands are open questions. To a great extent, this depends on the side the diasporans support and with which

31 On the question of diasporas' loyalties to their homelands and host lands, see the discussion in Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics*, op. cit.

side they cooperate. In cases where they cooperate with a majority in the homeland, the chances are better that they would have greater influence. Nevertheless, in cases where the diasporans cooperate with a dedicated and powerful minority in the homeland they may also be successful in influencing developments there.

In any case, as noted above, it is very difficult to accurately determine diasporas' actual impact on homelands' social and political actors. However, this applies mainly to these diasporans' ability to cause evident major changes in the situation in their homelands. Yet, it is pretty clear that despite their involvement, the ability of the cores of these diasporas to influence especially the long-term cultural, social, and political situation in their homelands is somewhat limited. Just to briefly mention again and reemphasize, the main reasons for this limited impact are: their dual loyalty to homeland and hostland; their profound involvement, efforts, and investments in the maintenance of the diaspora itself, a task that prevents them from investing more in their homeland; the disagreements and debates within the diaspora that are a result of the heterogeneity even of the core groups; the homelands' usually self-entrenched perceptions that they are sovereign states and the entire national centre; the homelands' strong and permanent aspiration to maintain their independence and to pursue what they regard as their own interests; the fear that their hostland would react forcefully in order to stop their involvement in homeland affairs.

Yet, on certain occasions diasporas may "succeed" in "achieving" negative influences on their homelands, especially in cases when problematic conditions exist there. Thus, when there are deep ethnic, religious, or ideological disagreements between various groups in the homeland and when the core diasporans actively support one of these groups, the reactions on the part of the homeland society or its government might be relatively fierce. Consequently, in extreme cases the connections between the homeland and the diaspora would also become very tricky.

On the other hand, when diasporas find themselves in extreme trouble in their hostlands, homeland governments and activist individuals and groups may try to improve their situation through contacts with the hostlands' governments and with some relevant organizations. Again, this is effective when a homeland is not in conflict with the hostland. Thus, as mentioned above, one of the recent major developments in the sphere of connections between many homelands and their diasporas is the establishment of Diaspora Ministries or special agencies in well-established states such as Japan, France, Italy, Israel, China, and India.

Empirical and analytical conclusions

As mentioned in the introductory comments, this article has two main purposes — examination of the empirical and analytical aspects. Accordingly, two relevant kinds of conclusions are presented here.

From the empirical perspective, it has been argued that the most important factors that influence all diasporas' extent of integration into their hostlands are:

a) *The ethno-national identity and identification.* The stronger the ethno-national-religious identity that is shared by the majority of diaspora members, which is especially shared by the core members, the less complete is the integration of such diasporans in the hostland. Consequently, core members of both incipient and established diasporas who are determined to keep up their ethno-national-religious identity maintain adequate relations with their respective homelands. In view of this situation, the homeland also maintains reasonable relations with the diaspora through the services of special ministries and agencies and through direct relations between individuals and groups in both entities. This facilitates the ability of such diasporas to be involved, but only to a degree, in cultural, social, political, and economic developments in the homeland. However, on certain occasions this involvement in homeland affairs creates clashes with the society and government of the hostland;

b) *the existence of clear diasporic cultural and social boundaries.* While the homeland would feel very satisfied when the diaspora succeeds in maintaining its nature, character, cultural and social boundaries, and organizations, the hostland demonstrates tough positions and applies aggressive policies toward these entities, which in turn makes it more difficult for diasporans, especially for members of incipient diasporas, to integrate into these hostlands;

c) *the existence of active diasporic organizations.* Once again, this factor might have two, almost opposite, consequences. On the one hand, such organizations serve as important tools for maintaining the ethno-national identity, cohesion, and relations with the homeland, and thus enhance the hostland's opposition and hostility towards these entities, which either totally prevent their integration or even drive them out of the hostland. On the other hand, such organizations encourage fuller integration into the hostland and thus diminish the diaspora's connections with the homeland and its ability to influence its culture and social and political patterns;

d) *the relevant cultural, social, and political conditions in hostlands.* In cases where these states are fundamentally hostile towards all ethnic-religious "others", the others' ability to integrate is pretty limited, and the chances are that in various cases the relations with the homelands are closer and

stronger. These closer relations with the homeland create greater difficulties in the hostland for the diaspora.

As far as diasporas' ability to influence what is happening in their homelands, members of incipient diasporas who are less integrated into hostlands and mostly connected to homelands nevertheless have less capacity to influence developments in their homelands. However, some core members of historical and modern diasporas maintain their ethno-national-religious identity and a certain loyalty to their homelands. Their ability to influence major developments in homelands is also limited.

It seems that the diasporans most effective in influencing long-range developments in their homelands are the cores of both established and incipient stateless diasporas. Essentially, this is because the situation of their homelands, kin, and social groups is highly problematic, particularly during their struggle to gain independence and sovereignty. In these cases the people in the homeland need their diaspora's political, diplomatic, moral, financial, manpower, and weapons support for the success of the struggle for turning the homeland, or part of it, into an independent state. However, after such national states are established, it is difficult to accurately assess their actual impact on the homeland society and political actors, and their ability to cause major changes in the situation there. On the whole it seems that during these post-independence years, the diasporas' ability to influence developments in their homelands declines.

From the analytical perspective, the most significant aspects discussed in the present article about the connection between integration in hostland and influence on homeland that should be taken into consideration and studied further are: a) first and foremost, a decision should be made whether to study the transnational or the diasporic entities; b) then one must consider the various groups that make up each of these categories of dispersals; c) the fact that none of these dispersals is homogeneous should be taken into consideration, and especially the distinction between the peripheral and core groups; d) the degree of cultural, social, political, and economic general position of each group in the hostland, and especially the degree of their integration should be examined thoroughly; e) the relations between the hostland and homeland should be considered since, as mentioned, these relations have a significant impact on the general connections between the diaspora and its homeland; f) then the spheres and issues in the homelands that interest the various groups of the diaspora should be discussed; g) the government and various organizations in the homeland that can block the intervention and the influence of the diaspora should be discussed next; h) despite the inherent difficulty in clearly determining the width

and depth of the diaspora's influence on developments in the homeland, especially in the abstract cultural sphere, the ability of the various groups in the diaspora to do so should be examined.

All these analyses should take into account the different periods of the developments in the hostland and especially in the homeland, in order to avoid generalizations, and to apply the same observations to various stages of the development of the hostlands, homelands, and diasporas.

